Antibiotics are valuable drugs that fight bacterial infections, but our supply of antibiotics is at risk. Existing antibiotics gradually lose their effectiveness due to bacterial resistance, and few new antibiotics are being developed to replace them. A variety of models have been proposed to promote the conservation of existing antibiotics and/or incentivize private actors, i.e., drug companies, to develop new ones. Previous models, however, all encourage investment in antibiotic research and development via patent rights, which also create an incentive to oversell antibiotics. Because the inappropriate use of antibiotics accelerates the development of resistance, patent rights put the public health objectives of antibiotic development and conservation in tension with one another. This article proposes an antibiotic-specific patent prize system that uncouples the two policy objectives necessary to achieve a stable antibiotic supply.
4 against these pathogens. 6 The likelihood that new antibiotics will be prescribed sparingly during their period of patent protection undermines the financial incentive for companies to develop them. 7 Moreover, drug makers may fear that resistance will impair sales of a new antibiotic. 8 Finally, the uncertainty of obtaining FDA approval for a new antibiotic thwarts some pharmaceutical companies from entering the antibiotic field.
9
Efforts to conserve antibiotic effectiveness and control outbreaks of infection face a different set of obstacles. First, measures that seek to limit the use of a particular antibiotic to medically necessary indications place the interests of public health squarely in opposition to those of drug manufacturers. 10 Consequently, the pharmaceutical industry has vehemently fought formulary restrictions that would promote antibiotic conservation. 11 A second incentive problem is that infection control measures, such as screening patients for infectious pathogens and isolating infected patients in special wards, may go unrewarded. 12 Individual hospitals that implement such preventative measures can reduce their use of antibiotics but may not be reimbursed for these activities by insurance companies. 13 The coordination of infection control programs between hospitals in a local area could also help prevent the spread of pathogens and 12 See id. at 124-26. 13 Id. at 126.
dampen the use of antibiotics. 14 However, financial incentives for regional cooperation among health care institutions are lacking as well.
15

II. Existing Models to Promote Antibiotic Development and Conservation
Within the last decade, several commentators have proposed a variety of models to address the potential antibiotic shortage. 16 Analysts have used different schemes for classifying these proposals based on three key elements. The first element used for classification is the legal mechanism that the proposal seeks to employ. 17 One group of commentators has identified four "primary legal tools" that most proposals use: property, regulation, contract, and tort. 18 Another element that serves as a basis for classifying proposals to promote long-term antibiotic effectiveness is the intermediate policy goal of the proposal: antibiotic production or antibiotic conservation. 19 The third element that analysts use to categorize antibiotic proposals is the type of incentive upon which the proposal relies: "push" or "pull." 20 17 Outterson, supra note 14, at 633. 18 Kesselheim & Outterson, supra note 3, at 107. 19 Id. 20 See MOSSIALOS supra note 16; Sharma & Towse, supra note 16.
the outputs of R&D result in a health gain." 21 For organizational simplicity, these proposals are categorized here according to legal mechanism (element one), but other elements of the proposals, i.e., policy goals and types of incentive, are discussed as relevant.
22
A. PROPERTY-BASED MODELS
Patent term extensions.
One property-based proposal to combat antibiotic shortage is to extend patent terms to give patent holders a longer period of exclusive rights. 23 In its most basic form, a patent term extension (PTE) provides the holder of a patent for a new antibiotic with an additional period of market exclusivity. 24 Commentators typically view PTEs as pull incentives because PTEs increase the size of the reward for development of a new antibiotic.
Because antibiotic markets are not lucrative, however, the marginal increase in value of an extended antibiotic patent term is unlikely to attract drug companies' interest. 25 to the transferred extension bears the cost of providing a new antibiotic for everyone.
36
Advocates counter that patients who need the drug to which the wildcard PTE is transferred will not disproportionately bear the cost of antibiotic development for two reasons: most patients have health insurance, and those who do not are still able to receive public health care.
37
Consequently, the general public will ultimately pay for the antibiotic via health insurance rates and taxes.
38
Other criticisms of PTEs are more difficult to rebut. One is that the reward conferred by wildcard PTEs for the discovery of a new antibiotic is essentially arbitrary. 39 With wildcard PTEs, the reward for a new antibiotic depends largely on factors such as timing that have no relation to the value of the antibiotic. For example, an early developer of a relatively modest antibiotic may receive a huge reward by selling its PTE to the owner of a blockbuster that is about to lose patent protection; a later developer of a truly innovative antibiotic may receive a much smaller reward because no blockbusters with expiring patents are available at that time.
40
A related concern is that wildcard PTEs may trigger patent races in which developers invest large sums to be the first to deliver a new antibiotic. 41 The costs of research and development in antibiotic development is expedited regulatory review. The fast-track option (FTO) is the mechanism of expedited regulatory review that has the greatest potential for impact on antibiotic development. The FTO mechanism entails consultation between the FDA and drug sponsor to make both the clinical and regulatory approval phases of development more efficient. 59 The FTO process could shorten the time required to get a drug approved by as much as three years.
60
Although an FTO could be applied directly to development of a new antibiotic, the FDA can best capture its value by selling the FTO to a company that applies the FTO to the drug of its choice.
For example, a recent study modeled the hypothetical value of purchasing an FTO for Prozac that would have expedited the approval process by two years and found that it would have been worth between $500-750 million.
61
The FTO can operate as either a push or pull incentive. 62 One commentator has proposed the use of FTOs by the Europeans Medicine Agency (EMEA), the counterpart to the FDA, as a push mechanism to raise money for research on neglected diseases. 63 61 Id. at 12. Modeling assumed that FTO was purchased five years prior to approval. Applying FTO to new drug candidate carries the risk that candidate will not get approval, so the modeling included alternative calculations based on assumptions that either Prozac was certain to get approved (no risk) or that risk could be estimated. Assumption of no risk produced value of $761 million, and estimation of risk produced value of $521 million.
62 Sharma & Towse, supra note 16, at 31. 63 See MORAN, supra note 59, at 2-6. 64 Id. at 4-6.
12 premise of this model is that the FTO is transferable so that any company can realize the value of the FTO, regardless of whether the company has its own blockbuster.
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The potential sale of fast-track review by the FDA to raise money for antibiotic development triggers three concerns. Foremost is whether the expedited clinical and regulatory review would result in bringing unsafe drugs to market. 67 Defenders argue that even if expedited review creates increased risk, FTOs would produce a net health gain: the benefit of having a new antibiotic would more than offset the safety costs of bringing a second drug to market via expedited review. 68 A second concern is the societal cost of effectively extending monopoly pricing of the drug to which the FTO transferred. 69 Like a wildcard PTE, the transferable FTO could be viewed as a tax on patients suffering from a specific disease (treated by the fast-tracked drug) to pay for antibiotics for everyone. 70 However, the same counterargument for PTEs applies to FTOs: the increased costs of the blockbuster are ultimately distributed to the public through health insurance rates and taxes. antibiotic. 73 For example, the FDA has made several changes to the standard of non-inferiority, including both relaxation and clarification, over the last twenty years. 74 The lack of certainty in the standard for approval may dissuade potential antibiotic developers, who could face large unanticipated increases in costs after they are far along the development process. 75 point. 79 Thus, bright-line rules for antibiotic approval may deprive the agency of the discretion it needs to approve important new antibiotics like daptomycin.
Waiver of antitrust laws.
Another regulatory mechanism to secure the antibiotic supply is to grant a limited waiver of antitrust laws to allow companies to coordinate sales of antibiotics. 80 Whereas most of the models discussed here incentivize antibiotic development, this proposal focuses primarily on antibiotic conservation. The basis for this proposal is that the biological mechanisms of antibiotic resistance often confer broad resistance to an entire class of antibiotics, so producers of different antibiotics within a given class may need to act collectively to stave off resistance. 81 According to this proposal, the FDA identifies combinations of antibiotics and infectious bacteria for which cross-resistance is a problem. 82 The FDA then issues certificates to the patent holders of the antibiotics in a given class that immunize these companies from antitrust prosecution as long as they meet specified conservation goals. 83 The proposal also contemplates PTEs as potentially necessary to prevent generic producers from entering the market and interfering with conservation efforts. Few proposals to solve the potential antibiotic shortage rely on direct research funding because it suffers from a variety of problems. One weakness is that the information asymmetry between funding agency and researcher may cause the latter to exaggerate the promise of a drug candidate. 93 Government bodies may not be qualified to assess the viability of grant applications and may therefore misallocate resources. 94 Another potential problem is that direct government funding may lack the long-term stability needed to support ongoing antibiotic development due to political variables. 95 As one group put it, "government funding is often set on an annual basis and is thus dependent on the individuals in power, the economic climate, and other perpetually changing factors." 96 The apprehension of funding instability may, however, be overwrought.
For example, annual funding for antimicrobial research rose steadily over the ten-year period from 1998-2007. 97 A third concern, common to all push incentives, is the lack of incentive to accelerate the development of resistance and shorten the effective lifespan of the antibiotic. 119 In contrast, the primary criticism of a prize system in which private patent rights are retained is that the public has to pay for the new antibiotic twice: once through taxes for the prize, and a second time through the market for monopoly prices. 120 Finally, the optional prize system has been attacked for its inefficiency in the context of drug development generally. 121 According to one analyst, companies will only opt for the reward if they believe that the government is willing to pay more for a drug than it is worth, so the public will always end up overpaying. 122 As discussed supra Part I, however, some commentators believe that the market undervalues antibiotics both for their primary patient benefits and for their positive secondary health effects. 123 Consequently, this concern may not apply to antibiotics. 
Publicly-sponsored early-stage research collaborations.
III. A New Model for Uncoupling Antibiotic Development from Sales (UADS)
A. OVERVIEW OF UADS MODEL
In light of the strengths and weaknesses of these models to secure the future antibiotic supply, this note describes a system for uncoupling antibiotic development and sales (UADS).
The UADS model incorporates ideas from several previous proposals into a system designed to address the unique combination of problems that confront developers of antibiotics. As the name suggests, the essential feature of this model is the uncoupling of antibiotic development from production and sales so that the incentives for antibiotic innovation and conservation are no longer misaligned. Instead, development and sales occur in two separate phases by two different sets of actors.
The motivating force in the development phase (phase one) of the UADS model is a patent buyout. 151 In phase one, pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies and PPPs develop new antibiotics and seek patent protection for the new compounds, formulations, or methods of use. To receive FDA approval for new antibiotics, developers must transfer their patent rights to the government in exchange for a substantial prize. Because FDA approval is conditioned upon relinquishing patent rights, participation in the prize system is, for practical purposes, mandatory.
In the patent buyout in phase one, new antibiotics are not released into the public domain by eliminating patent rights altogether; rather, the government retains the rights for use during the sales phase. The crux of the sales phase (phase two) is that the government licenses the patent rights to drug manufacturers to make and sell the antibiotics. Although the same company could develop and produce a given drug, these two functions may also be performed by separate entities. For example, innovative biotechnology companies and pharmaceutical firms with experience in clinical development may be the strongest competitors in the development phase.
In the sales phase, however, companies that specialize in manufacturing generic drugs may excel due to their experience at adapting rapidly to production of new compounds. The government also plays a critical role during the sales phase. By retaining rights in all new antibiotics through mandatory participation of developers, the government is well-positioned to promote antibiotic
conservation. An administrative body such as the FDA would be able to decide such issues as priority of antibiotic use and appropriateness of indications unencumbered by conflicting private interests.
The UADS model is based on the prize system embodied in the MIPA of 2007.
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According to the MIPA, "[a]wards to companies that reward successful product research can decouple the reward for product research development from the price of the product." 153 However, some objectives of the UADS model differ from those of the MIPA as a result of the differences in scope of the two proposals. The MIPA targets neglected diseases, whereas the UADS model focuses on bacterial infections poses as special set of challenges, discussed supra Part I. 154 The declared purpose of the MIPA is to enhance access to drugs by providing them to consumers at lower prices, but for antibiotics both higher prices and decreased consumer access serve the the larger sum between monopoly profits or the prizes." 159 In an optional system, a developer that knows it can receive a predictable return by registering for the prize can use that information to leverage a higher profitability from monopoly sales. In effect, the developer could use the prize to bargain with the public, which would pay either directly for the prize or indirectly via insurance rates and reimbursement. Making participation mandatory precludes developers from gaming the system in this way.
Implementation of a mandatory participation program requires a plan for the transition from the current system of private rights. The UADS model could adopt a transition plan similar in design to the one contained in the MIPA. 160 The MIPA recommended distributing 90% of the prize fund to private patent holders during the first year and decreasing the allocation by 9% per year over a ten-year period. 161 The balance of the fund that is not reserved for pre-existing private patent holders would be available for distribution to registrants of new drugs. The MIPA also placed a ceiling of 5% of the total annual fund value for any one drug registered under the program. 162 Thus, the MIPA could award the maximum payment for up to two new drugs during the first transitional year, and this number would increase to twenty by the end of the ten-year transition period. 163 In addition, the budget for the UADS model would be smaller than for the MIPA. Thus, raising the maximum award for an individual antibiotic above 5% of the total fund value might be appropriate for the UACS model.
Prize options.
Both the political viability and economic success of the UADS model depend on the size of the prize and how it is funded. The prize must be large enough to attract potential developers to invest in development of a product for which the private market has been inadequate. At the same time, the size of the outlay must not be politically unpalatable to voting constituencies who may already be skeptical of an unproven system. 164 The mechanisms suggested here for funding and awarding prizes under the UADS proposal are taken directly from previous patent prize models for neglected diseases. 165 The antibiotics market may provide an opportunity to test and perfect these ideas in a limited scope; a method that proves successful in the antibiotics arena may convince skeptics of the method's viability for a more expensive and expansive plan to cover neglected diseases generally.
Funding the prizes. Funding for the UADS proposal would come from the federal budget. Due to the length of time required for development of new drugs, the UADS model requires a funding commitment for an extended period. 166 The international HIF, focusing on the contribution of payors, recommends that participating countries commit to funding for a period 163 Another factor that casts doubt on the likelihood of having twenty or more antibiotics simultaneously registered during the UADS transition period is the pharmaceutical industry's dearth of antibiotic development activity over the last three decades. 164 Abramowicz, supra note 171, at 123. of twelve years. 167 Viewed from the perspective of prize recipients, the MIPA envisioned that a prize winner would be eligible for annual payments for a maxiumum of ten years. 168 Based on these models, a funding period of 10-15 years would be appropriate for the UADS model.
Another question for the UADS model is whether the obligation of the payor (i.e., the federal government) or the expected payment to the prize recipient should be fixed. Developers of the MIPA advocate the latter system because it facilitates budget planning by the government. A third consideration in distributing prizes is how to apportion value, and therefore prize money, between first-in-class antibiotics and follow-on derivatives. According to some commentators, one of the fundamental problems of the current patent system is that in encourages development of follow-on drugs over fundamentally new medicines. 179 A follow-on drug with superior clinical properties to the pioneering drug typically requires much less investment in research and development and has the potential to usurp the market from the first product. 180 Thus, follow-on drugs are attractive from the market perspective, but they typically provide only a marginal medical benefit. The reward systems in both the HIF and the MIPA were specifically designed to correct this misalignment of incentives between private developers and public health. 181 The possibility of antimicrobial resistance, however, makes antibiotics different from other drugs: a follow-on antibiotic can still have significant therapeutic value as long as it is not susceptible to the same mechanism of resistance that thwarted the effectiveness of the first-in-class drug.
C. FEATURES OF PHASE TWO future generations. 182 Although patent-based mechanisms for conservation of antibiotics have been proposed, these models do not resolve the fundamental tension between the incentive to conserve an antibiotic and the motivation to sell it to maximize profit. Thus, the UADS model places the responsibility for regulating antibiotic production and sales into the hands of the government.
Direct distribution by government. One mechanism for government regulation of antibiotic manufacture and sales is to charge the government with these responsibilities directly.
Although this option assures governmental control of antibiotic supply, it has several disadvantages. First, it requires the creation of substantial new governmental bodies that make, test, and distribute drugs. Not only does this increase the cost of the program, it raises questions about the government's experience and expertise in an area in which the private sector excels.
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Second, transferring antibiotic production and sales to government bodies would have an immediate adverse impact on companies that currently engage in these activities. The legislative and administrative changes required to implement such a system would therefore likely meet strong opposition by the pharmaceutical industry.
License to drug manufacturers. A more moderate approach to regulate antibiotic manufacture and sales is for the government to grant licenses to drug companies. Whereas previously-proposed patent prize systems seek to buy private patent rights to place the inventions (i.e., drugs) in the public domain, here the government exercises its patent rights as would a private patent holder. In this system, the government could issue a revocable license to produce and sell a new antibiotic and make the license contingent on meeting certain regulatory requirements. A licensing system takes advantage of the efficiency and experience of drug producers and does not require the establishment of an entirely new governmental workforce.
The legislative and administrative changes needed to implement a licensing system would be less drastic than those required for a direct-distribution system. Moreover, the pharmaceutical industry would be more favorably inclined toward such a system for a few reasons. First, a bill proposing such a system would have little impact on this sector because few companies currently engage in antibiotic development. Second, the possibility of licensing antibiotics from the government for manufacture would create future business opportunities for this sector.
Reimbursement.
A complementary mechanism of phase two of the UADS model is the use of reimbursement by public payors to regulate antibiotic use. The Antibiotic Continued Effectiveness (ACE) Program proposed by one group of commentators recommends using reimbursement to control antibiotic use in two ways: increasing payments to provide a stronger incentive for private drug developers who retain patent rights, and making these payments conditional on meeting conservation goals to promote antibiotic stewardship. 184 Although these policy levers would operate differently in the absence of private patent rights, they are still applicable in the UADS model. The critical point is that public reimbursement for antibiotics is well below the social value that these drugs provide, so raising payment levels is still efficient if it can achieve some other public health goal. 185 In the UADS model, public payors such as antibiotic development and conservation. The patent buyout in phase one of the UADS model is a pull incentive. Many commentators, however, advocate models that incorporate both push and pull incentives to promote drug development. 193 Several of the push incentives discussed in Part II can be implemented in conjunction with the UADS model because they operate upstream in the development process. Regulatory mechanisms such as tax credits, expedited review, and a streamlined review process can work in concert with the patent buyout in phase one to promote antibiotic development. Some contractual arrangements, e.g., direct funding of research and early-stage research collaborations, would also facilitate antibiotic development in phase one of the UADS model. Thus, the combination of the UADS patent prize with one or more push incentives could produce a more balanced and effective system to stimulate antibiotic innovation.
IV. Conclusion
Leaders in the medical, scientific, business, and pharmaceutical communities have recognized the need to act to ensure the continued supply of effective antibiotics. Antibiotics are vital to modern medicine, but they may become extinct if current trends in drug development and sales continue. One problem is that the patent system provides an inadequate incentive for the development of new antibiotics because they are less profitable than other drugs. This 192 See Kesselheim & Outterson, supra note 3, at 160-61. 193 Morel & Mossialos, supra note 6, at 1117; Sharma & Towse, supra note 16, at 5. predicament has stirred much discussion in the context of medicines for neglected diseases, and analysts have proposed a variety of solutions that entail changes to the current patent system. A second problem, which the patent system cannot solve, is that antibiotics eventually lose their effectiveness due to resistance. This challenge requires a public commitment to conservation.
As one group of commentators puts it, the crux of the growing antibiotic crisis is that " by using a licensing system in phase two, the UADS model requires minimal infrastructural change in the government. The UADS model eliminates the institutional conflicts inherent in the current patent system yet has the flexibility to accommodate other mechanisms that promote antibiotic development and conservation. By re-aligning private incentives with public health goals, the UADS model will allow future generations to enjoy the myriad health benefits that
